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1 The Bank of Amsterdam or Wisselbank, celebrated in its day, has had mixed fortunes in
the historic and economic literature. Held up on the one hand as a central factor in the
creation of the Dutch Republic's economic miracle,  the Wisselbank is also generally
seen as an archaic institution. The bank neither gave credit nor issued notes, which is
thought to have prevented it from evolving into a true central bank such as the Bank of
England, itself modelled on the Wisselbank, became during the 19th century. Such an
institution might have helped the Amsterdam money market to survive the disastrous
crises during the last quarter of the 18th century which crippled it. This state of affairs
was  prolonged  by  two  main  factors.  Firstly,  the  longevity  of  the  central  banking
paradigma requiring note circulation and lender of last resort operations as distinctive
features for such institutions; secondly, the lack of fresh research into the Wisselbank,
partly caused by the practical difficulties posed by the remaining bank records. The
entire Wisselbank literature is still based on secondary literature1. 
2 During  the  last  couple  of  years  the  situation  has  started  to  change.  The  actual
importance  of  bank  notes  and  lender of  last  resort  operations  receded  into  the
background,  showing that  even the  Bank of  England had exercised those  twin and
hallowed features during a limited period of its existence. Consequently, the narrow
conception of central banking evolution widened to appreciate alternative paths. In
addition, economic historians have begun to use sophisticated modelling for analysing
the Wisselbank's policy and performance. Recently, the American economists Stephen
Quinn and William Roberds used the available data for an important paper applying
econometric analysis to validate the bank's success in stabilising the guilder during its
first  decades  of  existence  (available  at  http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/
wp0516.pdf).
Lucien Gillard, La Banque d’Amsterdam et le Florin européen
Histoire & mesure, XX - 3/4 | 2005
1
3 In his very important book, Lucien Gillard takes the revision of the Wisselbank's history
a  great  step  further  by  presenting  a  sophisticated,  comprehensive,  and  detailed
analysis of the bank's policy and operations during its entire existence, from 1609 to
1820. His main conclusion is evident from the book's subtitle: during the 16th and 17th
 centuries, the banco guilder functioned as the common currency in Europe, as both the
reserve currency of choice and the central reference value. If this conclusion is not in
itself entirely new, the way in which Gillard demonstrates how this system came to be,
how the bank made it work, how the banco guilder shaped financial relations across
Europe, and how it enabled the Dutch Republic to have a Silver Age follow its Golden
Age, does represent a revolution in our understanding of the Wisselbank. The work is
based on a very wide reading in the secondary literature plus on what must be a huge
set of spreadsheets with published price data concerning money, precious metal, and
exchange  rates  in  Amsterdam,  London,  and  Paris.  There  are  some  gaps  in  the
bibliography,  notably  W. C. Mees'  pioneering  study  on  the  Wisselbank,  recently  re-
edited by W. L. Korthals Altes2, but the overall list is as impressive as the close attention
which Gillard has put to it.
4 The book consists of an introduction followed by six densely argued chapters. Chapter 1
focuses on the socio-political framework of the Dutch Republic, a somewhat loose
federation  of  seven  provinces  in  which  the  cities  had  a  large  or  even  dominant
influence.  Gillard  gives  much  attention  to  the  conflicting  interests  between  the
Orangist  centralizers  around the  court  of  the  Stadtholder  on the  one  side  and the
federalist, mercantile elites in the cities on the other, and attributes key policy changes
with respect to banking and currency to the ascendancy of one or the other of the two
political groups. I found this the weakest chapter of the book, marred both by repeated
slips  betraying  a  certain  unfamiliarity  with  the  Dutch  political  system,  and  by  an
unduly  heavy  reliance  on  the  testimony  of  foreign  contemporary  observers  to  the
detriment  of  modern  literature  on  the  subject.  This  leads  Gillard  to  some  odd
judgements, for instance, on the power wielded over the Republic by the authorities in
The Hague, on the causes of the Anglo-Dutch wars, and on the importance of monopoly
companies in the economy. In a later chapter (p. 116), he appears to think that in 1814
political reasons dictated that the Nederlandsche Bank was founded in the Hague and
not in Amsterdam, whereas of course King William I imposed his bank on the capital for
it would have remained dead in the water had he chosen the residence for its seat. 
5 A  more  serious  lack  of  contextual  discussion  undermines  Gillard's  verdict  on  the
Wisselbank's overall impact on the Republic's economy and society. In his view, first
touched upon in Chapter 1 and elaborated in later ones, the Wisselbank enabled the
Republic to sustain a dominant position in international trade and finance during the
18th century, but at a heavy social cost. An overvalued guilder created a divide between
the cosmopolitan commercial elite in the Holland towns, which greatly benefited from
the opportunities, and the rest of the population, which suffered the consequences in
the form of a declining competitiveness of local trade and manufacturing, resulting in
widespread  unemployment  and  poverty.  While  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the
contribution of the strong guilder to the Republic's loss of competitiveness, Gillard's
emphasis on the importance of this factor would have been more convincing had he
balanced  his  opinion  with  other  causes  discussed  in  the  literature,  such  as  the
mercantilist obstruction to Dutch exports abroad, plus the high taxation and high wage
costs  at  home.  Moreover,  Gillard  never  really  confronts  his  verdict  on  the  bank's
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negative social impact with his view elsewhere that it also had beneficial social and
political effects,  in shifting crucial and potentially divisive decisions about currency
and monetary policy to an impartial market. 
6 Another case where Gillard's judgement would appear to have been led astray by a too
close focus on his sources and his subject is in his opinion on the Wisselbank's demise.
He attributes this rather singularly to undue political interference, omitting to discuss
the wider economic and political circumstances which led to its downfall.
7 In  Chapter 2,  Gillard  discusses  the  bank's  functions  and  early  development.  The
Republic  faced  a  crucial  economic  problem:  as  a  small  country  with  a  high export
surplus, it suffered from a continuous inflationary pressure created by the influx of
poor quality foreign currency. This was remedied by having the Wisselbank act as a
sluice between the Republic's inland and its international currency flows, which also
erected a buffer cushioning the impact of international economic fluctuations. Gillard
again  draws  heavily  on  contemporary  observers  for  his  description  of  the  bank's
evolution.  This  again  inspires  him to  some curious  judgements,  but  these  are  now
largely outweighed by the yield of policy insights which can no longer be reconstructed
from the bank's own archive. A case in point is his analysis, here and in subsequent
chapters, of the role of the cashiers as nexus between the Wisselbank and the market.
Until now, the literature tended to belittle or even ignore their role, but Gillard shows
convincingly  how they made the system work by,  in  effect,  running the market  in
banco money and by performing the private credit functions which the bank itself did
not want to assume. By 1683 the cashiers' offices had effectively supplanted the bank's
own counters in dealing with customers.
8 Moreover, Gillard argues that the Wisselbank's statutory injunction on giving credit did
really  no  more  than  impose  a  split  into  banking  and  issuing  operations,  exactly
mirroring the internal separation into departments of the Bank of England during the
19th century. For the Wisselbank did give credit to the Dutch East India Company VOC
and to the Amsterdam city treasury, largely from its retained earnings and thus on a
limited scale. The restriction on the bank's credit function served to shift the risks and
profits  to  the  cashiers,  thus  contributing  to  boosting  a  sector  which  the  Bank  of
England's note monopoly stifled.
9 The book's real weight and greatest importance lie in its four last chapters, dealing
respectively with the bank's function within the Republic's currency system, with the
internal  currency circulation and the market for  gold and silver,  with the external
circulation  and  the  exchange  rates,  and  with  the  mechanisms  which  made  the
Wisselbank system work.  Here Gillard presents a huge mass of  data summarized in
tables and graphs to buttress his arguments about the bank's essential modernity as an
international currency regulator and a precursor to the present day European Central
Bank. One ardently hopes that Gillard may be persuaded to let the scholarly community
benefit  from  his  painstaking  work  in  assembling  data  on  exchange  rates  between
Amsterdam, London, and Paris, and the gold and silver prices in these cities, which he
uses in combination with the published Wisselbank data to build his argument about
the  rise  and  effectiveness  of  the  Euroflorin,  as  he  terms  the  banco  guilder.  These
chapters can be heavy going because of the very technical nature of the subject matter;
personally I would not claim to have understood, for instance, all the intricate turns of
reasoning on bank policy patiently dissected in Chapter 6. 
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10 Careful  study  and  rereading  does  pay  rich  rewards,  however,  in  the  form  of  deep
insights about the nature and working of the bank and its banco money. I was notably
struck by the way in which Gillard demonstrates how the nature and the value of the
celebrated agio or premium on the bank guilder changed over time as a consequence of
the Dutch Republic's currency policy. Moreover, he rightly asserts that the agio was
never really a single figure, but entirely dependent on the specific coins deposited by a
particular  customer.  His  discussion  of  currency  policy,  taking  the  guilder's
international  position  as  key  reference  point,  shows  this  to  have  been  remarkably
coherent and effective, whereas Dutch historians, as often as not departing from the
premiss  of  an  abstract  system, tend  to  overemphasize  the  haphazard  nature  of
subsequent  reforms.  To  me  Gillard's  treatment  of  the  momentous  policy  changes
during the last forty years of the 17th century, culminating in the introduction of the
recepissen, receipts for coin or bullion deposits operating as options, in 1683, provides
one of the book's highlights, together with his subsequent analysis of the bill market
and  the  multilateral  payments  system  centering  on  Amsterdam.  At  each  turn  of
argument, Gillard carefully shows the interaction between the various elements: bank
policy and instruments, currency policy, exchange rates, and bullion prices, and thus
greatly adds to our knowledge on this most intricate of subjects. 
11 Summing  up,  this  is  a  most  valuable  and  enriching  book  on  a  subject  of  great
importance for the understanding of banking and currency during the early modern
period. The occasional errors of judgement do not really detract from the huge overall
value of the book, and I fervently hope that Gillard will get the opportunity to iron
them out when preparing for the English translation which the book so fully deserves. 
NOTES
1. The data and documents published by the Dutch economic historians during the
1920s and 1930s: J. G. VAN DILLEN & Nicolas Wilhelmus POSTHUMUS (ed.), Bronnen tot de
geschiedenis der wisselbanken, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1925; Nicolas Wilhelmus POSTHUMUS, 
Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1943.
2. Willem Cornelius MEES, Proeve eener geschiedenis van het bankwezen in Nederland
gedurende den tijd der Republiek, Rotterdam, 1838 ; W. L. KORTHALS ALTES (ed.), Amsterdam,
NEHA, 1999.
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